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We study here the early impacts of the Peruvian Rural Roads Program (RRP), characterized by 
a decentralized mechanism that contracts private local firms for the rehabilitation and maintenance 
of rural roads with local supervision by community leaders setting incentives that favour prevention 
activities and a sustainable and timely maintenance of rural roads. The analysis  is based on  a 
quasi-experimental approach through which control roads are defined prior to the intervention and 
based  on  key  observable  characteristics  of  the  road  and  the  villages  they  connect.  Diff-in-Diff 
estimates are reported to control for biases associated with time-invariant unobservables. We find 
that this institutional innovation improved road transitability, which in turn led to significant changes 
in employment patterns and increased investments in education and health. Income effects are not 
significant  on  average,  but  they  appear  strong  in  villages  with  pre-existent  endowments  of  key 
productive infrastructure, favouring the notion that road improvements need to be complemented 
with additional investments to effectively contribute to the reduction of rural poverty. Most of these 
results, though, are concentrated on interventions in motorized roads, although the inclusion of non-
motorized  tracks  is  supported  by  the  empowering  of  women  through  their  participation  in  farm 
activities. Thus, the results of this early evaluation are encouraging in terms of program impacts, as 
these indicate that the Peruvian RRP has been able to control local capture and corruption threats. 
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1.  Introduction  
The  economic  literature  has  been  increasingly  reporting  mechanisms  through  which 
improved  roads  can  create  opportunities  for  economic  growth  and  poverty  reduction  in  rural 
economies (Binswanger, Khandker and Rosenzweig, 1993; among others). Through the reduction 
of transportation costs, improved roads can increase productivity and demand for labor in farm and 
non-farm activities, thus leading to increased income and consumption. Although often ignored until 
recently, improved roads can also have meaningful social impacts, in particular those associated 
with household investments in health and education (van de Walle, 2002). 
Nevertheless,  macroeconomic  adjustments  and  local  governance  issues  have  led  to 
underinvestment in this kind of infrastructure (World Bank, 2005). Moreover, rural transport projects 
have focused on building new roads or upgrading their condition, while disregarding the need to 
establish an institutional arrangement to guarantee timely rehabilitation and maintenance of roads 
(Malmberg Calvo, 1998). In that sense, the thrust of the Peruvian Rural Roads Program (RRP) as 
an institutional innovation that focuses on the rehabilitation and permanent maintenance of already 
existing rural roads, for which local private firms are contracted, makes it particularly important to be 
analyzed.  That  is,  public  funds  are  provided  not  only  for  one-time  rehabilitation  but  also  for 
permanent  maintenance  of  treated  roads,  and  payments  to  contracted  local  firms  require  a 
satisfactory  report  from  PROVIAS  and  community  supervisors.  To  my  knowledge,  there  is  no 
current study that carefully evaluates the impacts of a road program with such a similar institutional 
innovation. 
Analyzing  this  kind  of  intervention  is  particularly  relevant  given  the  current  wave  of 
decentralization in infrastructure provision in the developing world. The latter initiative, combined 
with community participation, can increase accountability of providers and lead towards a quality 
increase in service provision (World Bank, 2004). However, more recent studies have been more 
cautious about the ultimate effects of decentralization and community participation on the quality of 
infrastructure provision. Local capture and corruption can make provision of infrastructure worse 
under decentralized mechanisms (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2006; Olken, 2007). More empirical 
evidence is needed to see which of the trends ends up dominating under different contexts. 
Focusing  on  the  Peruvian  RRP,  this  paper  attempts  to  contribute  to  the  literature  by 
evaluating  the  impacts  of  such  a  unique  program  that  focuses  on  an  institutional  innovation  to 
improve road rehabilitation and permanent maintenance. The study tries to see whether we can 
define  a  decentralized  mechanism  or  contract  that  can  improve  the  quality  of  rural  roads  in  
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developing  countries,  and  whether  that  would  lead  to  increased  income  and  human  capital 
investments.  With  respect  to  the  former,  one  point  is  whether  including  permanent  road 
maintenance alters the nature of the contract enough, making local capture and corruption more 
complicated, and increasing the likelihood of improved quality of rural roads. With respect to the 
welfare effects of improved roads, a key issue is to analyze whether the factor of time is enough for 
effects to materialize, or whether complementary investments are required
1. In addition, it is relevant 
to see whether a program that focuses exclusively on rehabilitation and maintenance of rural roads, 
excluding any new road construction or road upgrading, can generate sizable welfare effects. Most 
of the interventions reported in the literature, especially those in Africa and Asia, include building 
new  roads  or  upgrading  them  (for  instance,  by  paving  them)  while  disregarding  regular 
maintenance. Indeed, the Peruvian RRP does not include pavement upgrades as in the Bangladesh 
case analyzed by Khandker et. al. (2006), nor includes building new roads as in the Vietnamese 
case studied by Mu and van de Walle (2007).  
Methodologically,  we  use  a  quasi-experimental  approach  that  allows  controlling for  time-
invariant unobserved characteristics of villages and households. Although we define a control group 
based on a rich set of observables, road rehabilitation and maintenance activities by other agencies 
are not banned in control roads, so that the impacts we report here are associated with an improved 
efficiency  in  road  rehabilitation  and  maintenance  as  a  result  of  the  RRP,  rather  than  with  the 
absolute lack of these efforts on the part of other public agencies such as local governments, or 
others. To my knowledge, there is no published study that focuses on such institutional innovation. 
We  use  a  longitudinal  dataset that  enables  us  to  measure  impacts  on  a  wide  variety  of  socio-
economic,  institutional,  and  environmental  characteristics.  Furthermore,  we  also  explore  the 
heterogeneity in the impacts by individual, household and village characteristics, as well as the 
conditioning community factors for realizing benefits. In particular, we analyze the extent to which 
poorer households, smaller communities, rural women, and other especially marginalized groups, 
benefit from the enhanced economic environment resulting from the Peruvian RRP. Policy makers 
would greatly benefit from identifying a conditional factor - either at the level of the community or the 
household - that spurs the impact of improved rural roads. However, if the key conditional factor 
varies  too  much  by  outcome  so  that  no  general  pattern  can  be  identified,  targeting  policy 
implications would be less clear. 
                                                 
1 Although the Peruvian RRP has been operating since 1998, this study focuses on the impact of the cohort of 
interventions  that  started  in  2004,  and  evaluates  its  impacts  after  only  two  years.  That  is,  the  estimated 
impacts we are presenting here need to be interpreted as the very early impacts of the improvement in rural 
roads generated by the institutional innovation.  
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This  paper  is  organized  in  five  sections  including  this  introduction.  The  second  section 
presents the key features of the intervention and discusses its expected effects. Section 3 describes 
the characteristics of the data and the methodology used for estimating the impact of the Peruvian 
RRP.  Section  4  presents  the  estimated  impacts  on  the  quality  of  the  roads  and  its  effects  on 
household income and expenditures, employment, as well as investments in education and health. 
Section 5 summarizes the results and discusses its limitations as well as some of its potential policy 
implications. 
2.  The program and its expected effects 
The Peruvian RRP is a large program that has been operating since 1995 and run by the 
PROVIAS  RURAL,  a  unit  of  the  Vice-minister  of  Transport.  The  program  intends  to  improve 
transport conditions in rural villages by contracting private local firms to manage and sustain the 
maintenance of rural roads in the poorest areas of Peru
2. The first phase of the RRP was carried out 
during 1995-2000 in 12 departments that ranked highest in rural poverty within the country
3. During 
that first phase, the project improved rural accessibility in 314 districts, contracting with 495 local 
firms in charge of rehabilitating and maintaining about 12,000 kilometers of rural roads and key 
secondary roads and about 3,000 km of non-motorized tracks (Escobal, et. al., op. cit.)
4. 
2.1  The intervention 
The RRP is based on an institutional innovation that focuses on setting the right incentives 
for all agents while also strengthening local governments and firms to improve rehabilitation and 
maintenance of already existent rural unpaved roads and non-motorized tracks. Rural roads in Peru 
are  the  responsibility  of  provincial  and  district  governments  since  the  enactment  of  the  Law  of 
Municipalities  of  2004
5.  However,  ambiguities,  overlaps  in  responsibilities  of  different  levels  of 
government, and the lack of financial and institutional resources at the local level have allowed for 
                                                 
2 Currently, the unit running the program is called PERU DESCENTRALIZADO, an indication of the increased 
role of local governments in the planning and execution of the program, as part of the decentralization process 
being carried out within the Peruvian state. 
3 See Figures 1-4 for photos with examples of the type of roads intervened. 
4 The system of district-level rural roads in Peru is estimated at 70,000 kilometers. In the 12 departments the 
system of rural roads is estimated in 28,000 kilometers. 
5 Typical of a centralized government, all roads were traditionally under the responsibility of the Ministry of 
Transport and Communications (MTC). The Regionalization Law of 2004 transferred all roads to regional and 
local governments. The mandate was partially reversed in 1991, as MTC was reassigned to the national road  
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avoidance of accountability in maintaining rural roads (World Bank, 1995). When a road is blocked 
due  to floods  or  other weather  shocks,  local governments  start  rehabilitation  with  technical  and 
financial support from the regional or central government, although the process tends to be slow. 
Responsibility is even less clear for regular maintenance; for instance, it is not clear where users 
can complain to for excessive potholes and stones in the roads, which in turn increase travel time as 
well as maintenance costs for public and private vehicles.  
Implementing the Peruvian RRP is a clear example of the decentralization process that has 
been  developing  in  Peru  over  the  last  two  decades.  It  commits  financing  from  the  central 
government,  works  with  local  governments  in  the  planning  of  activities,  and  assigns  the 
responsibility of performing quality rehabilitation and permanent maintenance of selected rural roads 
to local private firms through contracts that connect regular payments to the quality of the road as 
periodically  assessed  by  officials  from  both  the  program  and  local  governments,  as  well  as 
community organizations. This assessment is not limited to checking the materials the local firms 
use in the rehabilitation activities, as it can also use observable final outcomes such as travel time to 
go from startpoint to endpoint of the road segment, the number of months the road is blocked due to 
landslides during rainy season, or the ‘bumpiness’ of the road as this increases maintenance costs 
for  private  and  public  motorized  vehicles.  Observability  of  these  outcomes  helps  to  make  local 
authorities  and  contracted  firms  accountable  for  the  quality  of  maintenance.  Thus,  in  principle, 
incentives are set for local contractors to implement maintenance works more regularly, including 
maintenance of road drainage systems as these could prevent blockages, or other activities that 
reduce rehabilitation costs when weather shocks hit transitability of the road. 
Nevertheless, the incentive structure can be damaged if the program is captured by local 
elites as the supervision by local authorities is reduced to a mere formality. Olken (2007) reports the 
case of the Indonesian rural road program affected by corruption, as measured by the discrepancies 
between reported budgets and the budgets estimated by special supervisors based on an analysis 
of materials and labor used. However, it is important to notice that the Indonesian RRP, as opposed 
to the Peruvian RRP, does not include regular maintenance so that incentives cannot be set based 
on observable qualities of the road, and only by costly monitoring of the actual materials used during 
the construction, upgrading or rehabilitation. This evaluation allows us to see whether the program’s 
                                                                                                                                                                    




incentive structure has so far been able to control local capture and corruption threats, after almost 
a decade at work. 
The institutional innovation in the Peruvian RRP depends critically on the quality of local 
institutions, including local authorities and firms (Malmberg, 1998). Thus, the RRP promotes local 
institutional  development  by  providing  technical  assistance  to  local  governments  and  small  and 
medium  local  enterprises  for  improved  planning  and  management  of  rural  roads  and  for  the 
development of micro-enterprises formed by beneficiary groups for road maintenance. The program 
has a local office in every department, which starts by identifying the provinces in which they will 
operate in each stage. Once a province is identified, the program then forms a Provincial Road 
Institute (PRI) which signifies increasing participation of the provincial municipality and other local 
authorities. The program’s departmental office coordinates with the PRI to select the specific road 
segments to be rehabilitated and maintained at each stage, with other local institutions participating 
through open consultations in different districts. 
Once a road has been selected for intervention, local officials from the program and local 
government  authorities  coordinate  to  initiate  the  intervention  with  an  open  call  for  individuals 
interested in becoming members of the local microenterprise for road maintenance (MEMV is its 
acronym in Spanish) that is going to be in charge of the periodic rehabilitation and maintenance of 
the  selected  road  (Escobal,  et.  al.,  2005).  They  are  then  selected  based  on  their  previous 
experience in road maintenance, time of residence in the locality, as well as characteristics such as 
education, age, etc. The selected individuals are trained in microenterprise management and road 
maintenance,  and  the  MEMV  is  legally  formed.  Next,  the  program’s  local  officers  elaborate the 
annual plan of activities using a program that calculates the number of individuals and time required 
to rehabilitate and maintain the selected road as well as the cost per kilometer
6. These estimates 
are based on the characteristics of the selected road such as its location, length, width, traffic, and 
weather conditions. The MEMVs then sign a contract with PROVIAS RURAL through which they 
receive monthly payments, based on the estimated costs and a quality certification issued monthly 
by PROVIAS and community supervisors
7. As mentioned above, these output-based contracts set 
                                                 
6 Escobal et. al., op. cit., reports that average costs are US $ 17,000 per kilometer rehabilitated and US $ 
2,800 per kilometer for periodic maintenance. Technical standards suggest rehabilitation is required every 10 
years while periodic maintenance is on average required every four years, In addition, the program funds US 
$ 700 per kilometer-year in regular maintenance. 
7 In case of unsatisfactory maintenance, supervisors give time to the MEMV to repair the deficiencies. If the 
situation  is  not  solved,  the  local  office  applies  discounts  to  the  monthly  payments,  and  the  contract  is 
dissolved if the deficiencies occur over three consecutive months.  
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clear incentives for the local MEMV to invest in prevention activities and provide a sustained, timely 
maintenance of the contracted rural road (Benavides, 2003). 
In terms of the kind of rural roads targeted by the program, it is important to point out that, 
unlike previous cases recently analyzed in the literature, the Peruvian RRP does not include road 
paving or the building of new roads. Second, the program not only considers unpaved motorized 
roads  but  also  non-motorized  tracks.  The  gradual  inclusion  of  non-motorized  tracks  aims  at 
promoting  gender  equity  in  distributing  the  impacts  of  the  intervention,  as  these  tracks  were 
identified as the ones women use most
8. 
2.2  Expected effects 
Setting  the  right  incentives  for  contracted  local  firms  should  improve  the  quality  of 
rehabilitation and maintenance of rural roads treated by the program. Increasing the regular removal 
of bumps and stones would, in turn, reduce the time required to travel across the different points 
connected by the selected roads or the time they remain blocked when large weather shocks lead to 
landslides or flooding. Thus, we can expect the program to better integrate poorly accessible zones 
to regional economic centers, reducing transport costs and raising the reliability of vehicular access 
to expand markets for agricultural and non-farm products and enhancing a more diversified set of 
employment  opportunities for rural  households. Improved  transportation  will  also  reduce  time  to 
access  basic  social  services  such  as  health,  education  and  justice.  In  turn,  this  improved 
transitability may lead to an increase in traffic and the availability of public transport services, but 
these may take longer as they require supply adjustments. 
However, it is important to clarify here that our counterfactual is not complete inaction with 
respect  to  the  rehabilitation  and  maintenance  of  rural  control  roads.  Such  roads  may  not  have 
guaranteed  financing  for  rehabilitation  and  maintenance,  nor  a  specific  agent  with  the  clear 
responsibility and incentives to perform the actual physical works. Thus, control roads may take 
longer to be rehabilitated after a flood, or have bumps and stones that increase travel time and 
vehicle maintenance costs. Still, local governments and other offices of the Ministry of Transport 
and Communications (MTC) as well as public agencies such as FONCODES (the Peruvian social 
investment fund) may have performed related activities for control roads, especially when weather 
                                                 
8 The program identified this fact when it collected the opinions of potential beneficiaries through gender-
based focus groups organized in several rural communities (see Fort and Menendez, 2005). Additional focus  
8 
 
shocks  blocked  these  roads.  Thus,  rather  than  assessing  the  impacts  of  rehabilitating  and 
maintaining a rural road, this study evaluates the effects associated with the improved efficiency in 
these rehabilitation and maintenance activities as a result of the reallocation of incentives due to 
output-based  contracts  that  favor  prevention  and  sustained  and  timely  maintenance  by  local 
contractors
9. 
Many  papers  have  shown  the  different  mechanisms  through  which  improved  rural  roads 
benefit the welfare of households and individuals associated with beneficiary roads (Mu and van de 
Walle, 2007; Khandker, et. al., 2006; Levy, 2004; Escobal y Ponce, 2002; Jacoby, 2000; among 
others).  We  briefly  summarize  the  most  important  findings  of  these  literature,  with  some  extra 
comments regarding the sequence of effects as they may affect the time needed for some of these 
effects to materialize. The most direct effects of the RRP are associated with the transitability of 
rural roads, which are often estimated through the travel time needed to go from the initial to end 
points of the segment in reference and the time (weeks or months in a year) a road stays blocked 
due to a climatic shock or related event. Levy (2004), for instance, reports such effects in Morocco, 
emphasizing the importance of the number of months the road remained blocked (in the context of 
rural roads). Other subsequent effects are reduced time that individuals residing in the connected 
villages take on average to go to key markets, schools, health facilities, depending on the nature of 
the role of the segment on the local road network. At the same time, the improved transitability may 
eventually lead to an improved public transportation service that can be measured in terms of the 
increased frequency of buses or reduced prices for transporting individuals and cargo. The latter 
effects are clearly a function of the improved transitability of treated roads, and thus they are likely 
to take longer to materialize. 
The  improved  rural  roads  activate  a  series  of  mechanisms  that  transform  traditional 
productive  patterns,  both  agricultural  and  non-agricultural,  in  the  villages  associated  with  the 
rehabilitated segments. First, reduced travel times help individuals have access to extra off-farm 
employment  opportunities  (both  agricultural  and  non-agricultural)  within  and  outside  the  village. 
Escobal and Ponce (2002) find such a result in the first round of interventions by the Peruvian RPP, 
                                                                                                                                                                    
groups  after  the  intervention  have  confirmed  that  a  large  proportion  of  women  see  the  program’s  road 
intervention as enabling them to travel farther and more safely, and has also led to increased income. 
9 This issue is particularly important in the case of the Peruvian RRP, as local governments have seen a 
substantial  increase  in  their  budgets  as  a  result  of  the  decentralization  process.  Note  that  the  RRP 
intervention does not include road upgrading as in the Bangladesh case analyzed by Khandker et. al. (2006) 
nor building new roads as in the Vietnamese case studied by Mu and van de Walle (2007).   
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especially in terms of non-agricultural wage employment for more educated individuals
10. Jacoby 
(2000) also argues for such effects as he finds a negative correlation between agricultural and non-
agricultural wages and the distance from the village to the key markets in Nepal. 
Farm productivity and income can also receive a boost as a result of reduced post-harvest 
crop  losses,  lower  input  prices,  higher  output  prices  or  improved  access  to  financial  and  non-
financial agricultural services (Biswanger, Khandker and Rosenzweig, 1993). Improved accessibility 
to  markets  increases  small  farmer’s  bargaining  power  with  local  traders.  Access  to  credit  and 
agricultural extension services may take longer and come first for less poor farmers or in villages 
closer  to  larger  markets,  as  they  tend  to  require  extra  conditions  such  as  mechanisms  for 
agricultural risk management and organization of small local farmers. Access to these services is 
seen as crucial for small farmers to switch towards high-value crops. 
However, these productivity and income effects have not been found in all cases and are 
often concentrated on less poor farmers, consistent with the fact that complementary investments 
are required for them to materialize. Moreover, income effects may at least initially be perceived as 
temporary, and consequently households may decide to increase savings through increments in 
livestock rather than increased consumption (Escobal and Ponce, 2002). More important for this 
study is the fact that many of these effects are conditioned on adjustments in the supply of key 
agricultural services such as extension and credit, which may take longer to materialize. Thus, it 
would not be that surprising if we do not find income effects in this study, especially if we consider 
that the follow up in which this study is based comes only two years since treated roads started 
being served by the program. 
Improved  rural  roads  can  spur  not  only  productivity  and  income  but  also  household 
investments in the human capital of their children. As travel times are reduced, it is less costly for 
parents to send their younger children to school as they would need to devote less time traveling 
with them to the school location. In turn, older children would be able to attend school while at the 
same time being able to help with housework or at the family farm. Levy (2004), for instance, finds 
increased school attendance especially among girls, which may imply that improved travel security 
may also be an important factor for rural girls. These demand-side effects are likely to show up 
early. But supply-side effects may also increase household investments in schooling as quality can 
                                                 
10 One can think of a more direct employment effect associated with the maintenance work performed by the 
local firm. However, such effects are not likely to be important in this context, as these firms have on average  
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improve as a result of more effective attendance by teachers or even improved recruiting as a result 
of reduced travel times to larger villages or the district capital. However, the teacher recruiting effect 
may be expected to take longer to show up. 
Similar  mechanisms  can  be  cited  to  explain  improved  access  to  health  services.  With 
improved  roads,  visits  to  health  facilities  may  take  less  time  for  the  ill  individual  or  the  family 
member in charge of their care. The attendance and recruiting efforts can be raised for doctors and 
other health professionals, in the same way they were mentioned for school teachers. In addition, 
improved  roads  can  also  help  bring  social  programs  based  on  health  facilities  closer  to  the 
associated  villages,  increasing  access  to  preventive  health  programs  that  can  reduce  sickness 
events  among  children  and  adults.  Qualitative  studies  in  Sub-Saharan  Africa  and  Asia  have 
reported that individuals identify improved access to health services as the key benefit obtained 
from improved roads (see, for instance, Porter, 2002 and Hettige, 2006). 
All these positive effects may significantly alter the socio-economic context in the villages 
associated with the improved roads so that migration of individuals in search of better employment 
and education opportunities may be reduced. At the same time however, permanent and temporary 
migration costs are reduced. Thus, the net effect of improved roads on permanent and temporary 
migration may go either way. 
In sum, we have seen a wide variety of potential impacts of the Peruvian RRP. However, not 
all of them are likely to show up in this early evaluation after just two years. It is also likely that the 
size and time lags of these effects may vary across households and villages depending on the initial 
endowments of private and public assets. Poverty in developing countries is strongly concentrated 
in rural areas, but still there is significant heterogeneity that can lead to differentiated impacts and 
have important implications for project design. If higher or faster impacts are found in less endowed 
households and villages initially, policy makers will face a much desired win-win situation. However, 
if higher impacts concentrate among the initially better endowed, targeting for higher impacts may 
lead to increased inequalities within rural economies. Khandker et. al. (2006) and Mu and van de 
Walle (2007) explore the nature of these heterogeneities, finding that road improvements tend to be 
pro-poor  in  rural  Bangladesh  and  Vietnam,  respectively,  which  is  a  very  encouraging  result. 
However, peculiarities of the Peruvian RRP require us to analyze whether such a trend is sustained 
                                                                                                                                                                    
only between 10-15 permanent workers and we observe a representative sample of villages that have on 
average 900 inhabitants (see Table 3).  
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when  the  intervention  does  not  include  road  upgrades,  but  instead  includes  a  permanent 
maintenance component for both unpaved motorized roads and non-motorized tracks. 
3.  Design, data and methodology 
3.1  Quasi-experimental design 
For this intervention, treatment and control roads are not chosen randomly from a set of 
eligible roads. Instead, treatment roads are first selected by a departmental committee (program 
officials and local authorities) that chooses the provinces to be intervened. Then, the PRI and the 
local  program  officials  select  the  specific  road  to  be  intervened  at  a  particular  round.  For  this 
treatment group, a control group was selected prior to any intervention based on similarities in key 
observable variables such as the longitude and type of road (rural road or non-motorized track), and 
characteristics of the villages involved such as population size, access to basic public services and 
infrastructure, and altitude
11. 
Another important matched variable is the hierarchy of the villages involved, so that if a 
district capital was involved in the treated road, the control road also connected a district capital. In 
addition, control roads are also required to have no intersection with  a treated road or track to 
minimize  the  probability  that  benefits  on treated  villages  spill  over  the  control  villages.  Actually, 
control roads were selected within the same province but from different districts to minimize the 
possibility that they belonged to the same road network as the treated ones This effort was based 
on  information  provided  by  three  key  databases:  the  1999  Pre-census  database  (INEI),  the 
Population Census of 2005 (INEI) and the Geo-referenced Road Map (MINTRA-MINEDU), which is 
rarely available in a digital format for use in economics research. Table 3 shows the pre-treatment 
means  for  treatment  and  control  groups  for  many  observable  variables,  showing  that  there  are 
almost not statistically significant differences between these two groups
12.  
The  selection  process  described  for  this  intervention  has  important  implications  for  the 
interpretation  of  the  impact  estimates  we  present  here.  First,  it  implies  that  our  indicator  would 
estimate a treatment on the treated effect. The relationship between our estimates and the average 
                                                 
11 Control roads were selected by researchers in charge of impact evaluation, although some information was 
confirmed by program officials. The program was then informed to remain away from these road segments, 
which was not a major problem for the program as it was not likely for them to treat several road segments in 
a province, at least in the same round. Treated and control roads are associated with villages by defining the 
origin and the end of the road. 
12 For the outcomes analyzed in this study, Table 4-Table 12 show treatment-control comparisons at baseline. 
No significant differences are found there.  
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treatment effects would depend on the nature of the prioritization. If the PRI-selected roads are 
associated with the poorest and most remote villages, and those would be the ones for which the 
RRP impacts are smallest, then we would be underestimating the program’s average effects. On the 
other hand, if roads where selected so that impacts would be largest, and these officials were right 
in their ex-ante assessments, then we would be overestimating its average treatment effect. 
Second, the selection may affect our ability to identify a proper control group. The selection 
may be so acute that the likelihood of identifying a road similar in all characteristics to the treated 
ones  is  rather  low.  We  argue,  though,  that  the  size  of  the  intervention  in  any  province  and 
department and the measures taken by our team helped contain such a potential problem. A key 
issue  is  to  avoid  choosing  roads  that  are  systematically  located  at  different  points  of  the  road 
network as control roads. For that, besides similarities in access to key infrastructure, altitude, and 
population,  we  argue  that  the  hierarchy  of  the  towns  is  crucial.  That  is,  if  a  district’s  capital  is 
associated with the treated road, we look for another road that connects another district capital to a 
similar ending town. In general, for each treated road, we restrict the search to different districts 
within the same province. However, when one of the towns was sensibly different from the rest of 
the province, we  looked for roads in the adjacent provinces
13. Although the described selection 
process for the control group attempts to maximize the probability that the control group will be 
equivalent to the treatment group of roads, we cannot discard the existence of certain time-variant 
unobservable data that can affect our estimates. 
3.2  Data requirements and sources 
The impact evaluation presented in this paper refers to the cohort of interventions defined for 
2004 and uses the last two rounds (2004 and 2006) of a specialized household and community-
level  survey  that  includes  a  wide  variety  of  socio-economic,  institutional  and  environmental 
indicators
14,15. For the most part, the survey questionnaires were the same for the two rounds, and 
                                                 
13 That was the case, for instance, when a district capital was involved. Recall that treated roads needed to be 
unpaved, so capital of provinces has generally not been directly associated with treatment roads. 
14 The Peruvian RRP also applied a baseline survey in 2000 that would allow the analysis of the impacts of 
that cohort of interventions, also providing valuable information about the dynamics of the RRP’s effects. That 
is,  we  would  be  able  to  verify  the  time  lags  and  sustainability  of  effects.  However,  such  an  analysis  is 
postponed for the project’s second stage, as a very time consuming effort will be required to generate a 
consistent panel across the three rounds (2000, 2004 and 2006). 
15 The 2004 round of the survey was applied by the firm Cuánto while the 2006 round was applied by GRADE. 
Both  surveys  were  done  in  coordination  with  the  Rural  Roads  Program  as  part  of  the  program’s  impact 
evaluation strategy.  
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they were all applied in the fourth quarter of the corresponding years so that consistent comparisons 
are allowed. The household survey includes information about the characteristics of the dwelling, 
health  and  education  of  all  household  members,  farm  and  non-farm  entrepreneurial  activities, 
commercialization channels, etc
16. The community-level survey is applied to key local informants 
and  includes  information  about  the  characteristics  of  the  villages  in  terms  of  access  to  public 
infrastructure and basic services, distance to nearest markets, and other key public facilities. It also 
includes the roads’ characteristics such as the time required to travel from the initial to the final point 
of the road by the different means, the number of public transportation units that use the roads, the 
number  of  months  the  road  remain  closed  over  the  past  year,  number  of  car  accidents,  and 
maintenance and operation costs for public transportation units traversing the road. The survey also 
considers the number of students in primary and secondary schools, number of health services 
offered by public health facilities, judiciary and police crime records, use of associated roads, among 
many other variables. 
Recall treated and control roads are associated with villages at the origin and the end of the 
road.  In  the  case  of  small  roads  or  tracks  (less  than  20  kms.),  six  households  were  randomly 
selected within each of the initial and end villages. In the case of large roads, an extra, intermediate 
village is included in the sample. The 2004 sample cohort of interventions involved 92 treated road 
segments in 13 of the poorest departments in the country. At baseline, we interviewed a total of 
2,457 households in 387 villages associated with treatment and control road segments
17. In 2006, 
we were able to re-interview 2,167 of them, that is, we had an attrition rate of 11.8percent
18. 
3.3  Methodology 
The study uses the Double Difference (DD) estimate to determine the impact of the rural 
roads  program  on  a  wide  variety  of  indicators  at  the  level  of  the  household  and  the  localities 









t ijt D D D D Y e b b b b + × × + × + × + = 3 2 1 0        (1) 
                                                 
16 See Table 1 and 2 below for a list of the main indicators available in all survey rounds. 
17 In 2000, a baseline was established for a sample of 2,000 households associated with the road segments 
that were treated during 2000-2001. That sample was also followed in the 2004 and 2006 round of surveys. 
18 When  a  household  was  not  initially  identified,  the  field  procedures  to  address  this  included  asking  the 
neighbors,  relatives  and  community  leaders.  Although  there  were  a  few  rejections,  most  of  the  missing 
households corresponded to cases in which the nuclear family had moved outside the province.  
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where  ijt Y  denotes the value of an indicator of interest for household i that resides in village j 
at period t (t=0 is the baseline; t=1 is the follow-up survey). 
TC D  is a categorical variable that takes 
value one if the household resides in a treated village and zero if it resides in a control village. 
AD D  
is a categorical variable that takes value one if the observation is from the follow-up survey and zero 
if  it  comes  from  the  baseline.  Finally,  ijt e   denotes  the  error  term  which  is  assumed  to  be 
independent across villages but not necessarily within them
19. In that setting,  3 b  is the DD estimator 
of the impact of the program on variable Y , and is often called an average effect as it refers to all 
beneficiaries without distinction. 
If we identify systematic differences between the treatment and control groups in observable 
variables, we would need to include some controls in expression (1) to check the robustness of our 
DD  estimate.  Furthermore,  we  cannot  assure that  there  are  non-observables  that  can  establish 
systematic differences between treatment and control groups, but the DD estimate can help control 
for any time-invariant systematic non-observable difference by including household fixed effects
20. 





t ijt D D Y e u l b b + + + × × + = 3 0           (2) 
where  t l  and  ij u  denote the year and household fixed effects, respectively. As we plan to 
analyze  the  heterogeneity  of  the  effects  depending  on  the  characteristics  of  the  roads  and  the 
beneficiary villages, the associated econometric analysis will use the following formulation: 








t ijt X D D D D Y e u l g b b + + + × × × + × × + = 3 3 0     (3) 
where  X  is another dichotomic variable that takes value 1 if the household or village has 
the characteristic of interest or concern. In that case,  3 b  comes to be the DD estimator of the 
program’s impact for those households or villages that do not have the characteristic of interest X, 
                                                 
19 Thus, we use the Huber-White covariance matrix estimator to obtain the standard error of our coefficients of 
interest. 
20 Since we do not have a randomized control trial, we cannot discard that some time-variant unobservable 
effects may bias the DD estimate. One way we could argue against such a bias is to show that trends prior to 
the  intervention  are  similar  in  both  treatment  and  control  groups  (see  Galiani,  Gertler  and  Schargrodsky, 
2005). Such could be done for schooling variables as we have a series of school censuses, but not for most of 
the variables analyzed here.  
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and  3 3 g b +  denotes the impact for those that do have it. The impact evaluation proposed here will 
pay special attention to differentiated impacts by gender, education, ethnicity and village size. 
4.  Results 
Table 4 Table 11 present the results obtained for road transitability, income, expenditures, 
poverty,  employment,  school  attendance,  and access  to  health  services.  In  each  table,  we  first 
report the number of households or individuals involved in the estimation. The first two numbered 
columns present the averages for each outcome for the treatment and control groups at baseline, 
while column (3) reports the difference
21. Columns (4) to (6) do the same for the follow-up survey. 
Column (7) reports the DD estimate that resulted from assessing expression (1) in the previous 
section, while column (8) reports the DD estimate when controlling for household fixed effects as 
specified  in  expression (2).  Results  are  always  shown  separately for motorized  roads  and  non-
motorized tracks as they may play different roles in connecting rural households to basic services. 
4.1  Impacts on transitability of roads 
The first important verification is that the program generated a significant reduction in the 
average time required to travel from the start point to the endpoint of the road in reference (Table 4). 
In the case of motorized roads, the reduction is 28 minutes from an initial travel time of 100 minutes. 
In the case of non-motorized tracks, the reduction is 37 minutes from an initial travel time of 173 
minutes.  
As  suggested  from  the  discussion  in  the  previous  section,  it  would  have  been  very 
interesting to measure the effect in terms of number of months a year the road stays closed as a 
result of climatic shocks. Unfortunately, such information was only collected for treated roads in the 
2004 round; hence, we cannot assess the DD estimator for such variable. We can only verify that 
such blockages were even more problematic in 2006 than in 2004. However, table 5 also shows 
that community leaders and household heads tend to report an increased level of satisfaction with 
rehabilitation work in treated localities. In the case of rehabilitation of motorized roads, community 
leaders in treated villages reported adequate work in 81 percent of the cases by the time the follow 
up survey was done, up from 62 percent at baseline. Improved satisfaction is similarly observed 
among households as they increased the reports of positive benefits out of the rehabilitated road.  
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This increased satisfaction among household heads is also found in the case of non-motorized 
tracks. However, an initially puzzling result was that community leaders reported a deterioration in 
the quality of the rehabilitation and maintenance work in non-motorized tracks within the program. 
Discussions with PROVIAS officers suggest that such reports may be a result of dissatisfaction with 
the unfulfilled expectation of the track being upgraded to a motorized road, rather than an evaluation 
of the quality of the rehabilitation work performed by the contracted MEMV
22. 
These results are non-trivial for the program. First, the positive results on travel time and in 
the perception of the quality of the program intervention provide evidence against local capture or 
corruption  of  the  program’s  mechanism  by  maintaining  payments  to  MEMVs  despite  significant 
reductions in the quality of the rehabilitation and maintenance. Moreover, considering the program’s 
age (recall that it started in 1995), positive impacts on the 2004 cohort of interventions indicate that 
the program has been resilient to such threats. Second, positive impacts are sustained despite the 
fact that many local governments have seen their budgets increase during the period of economic 
growth and progress in the decentralization process. Indeed, the number of other roads associated 
with  treatment  and  control  villages  that  were  treated  during  the  observation  period  has  been 
important (Table 4). In the case of motorized roads for instance, villages associated with treated 
(control) roads had 0.92 (0.73) roads rehabilitated during the previous two years at baseline, and 
that number increased to 1.72 (1.57) by the follow up survey in 2006
23. Thus, these positive impacts 
indicate that the difference with the program would likely go beyond the extra money spent on road 
rehabilitation and maintenance, emphasizing on the clear incentives provided by the contracts with 
MEMVs. 
In the following sub-sections, we analyze the implications of the improved transitability upon 
income and expenditure patterns, employment decisions, and household human capital investments 
by type of road. 
                                                                                                                                                                    
21 Notice that for almost all analyzed outcomes, differences between treatment and control groups are not 
significant, and this is also the case for the variables reported in Table 3.  
22 Also, recall that monthly payments to local MEMVs are contingent on a satisfactory report from program 
supervisors, and consecutive negative reports lead to a cancellation of the contract. 
23 Although, road rehabilitation also increased in control roads, it is clear that there is no observed bias in the 
quantity of rehabilitated roads between treatment and control groups, so that no strong evidence is found for a 
contamination bias. There could be a difference in the quality of rehabilitation work in favor of treated villages, 
but such difference would be rightly assigned to the program’s impact if associated with the transmission of 
the program’s methodology to the local governments involved.  
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4.2  Impacts on labor income, employment, expenditures and poverty 
Table 6 reports the average effects of the Peruvian RRP on household labor income (farm 
and  non-farm),  expenditures  and  poverty.  We  do  not  find  significant  effects  in  any  of  these 
variables. A natural first explanation would be the time variable, as two years may not be sufficient 
for changes to materialize
24. Although markets could become closer as a result of improved roads, 
key agents may need time to adjust to new conditions. Regarding farm income for example, farmers 
may take more time to recognize that it has become less convenient for them to sell their crops by 
the field or adjacent road than in local fairs or regional markets. Even if they have already noticed it, 
it may not be that easy for farmers to break the long-term relationship with local merchants
25.  
However, before going any further trying to explain the absence of these income effects, we 
may want to explore whether some sub-groups might present some positive impacts. Interventions 
that  enhance  farmers’  productivity  tend  to  initially  benefit  those  that  were  better  off  before  the 
program, as they tend to have all the other conditions required to benefit from improved roads. 
However, it is also feasible to find a pro-poor bias if the less poor are less constrained by bad roads 
because they may have other assets to compensate. Indeed, recent studies evaluating rural roads 
programs in developing countries have reported encouraging pro-poor biases in their impacts. For 
instance, Khandker et. al. (2006) find that some of the effects of a rural roads program on household 
expenditures accrue among the poorest households in Bangladesh. Mu and van de Valle (2007) 
also find that the impacts of the Vietnamese rural roads project concentrate in the country’s poorer 
communes. Still, it would be important to check whether this bias also works in the case of the 
Peruvian RRP, considering that the results we are reporting here ought to be considered as early 
impacts, and also because of the peculiarities of the Peruvian program with respect to the other 
cases discussed here, namely that it does not include pavement upgrades or building new roads. 
On the other hand, it does include financing of permanent maintenance of treated rural roads
26. 
                                                 
24 Recall that the interventions in the round of treated roads we are analyzing started in 2004, while the follow 
up survey was done in 2006 (see discussion in section 2). 
25 See Escobal (2005) for a discussion of the complex decision  process associated  with the selection of 
markets by Peruvian rural farmers in Huancavelica. The author argues that local merchants establish more 
personal relationships with local farmers as they tend to be their first alternative to sell. Such sales provide the 
farmer with the cash necessary to afford taking chances at more profitable but farther and riskier markets 
such as local fairs or regional markets. Huancavelica is part of the area targeted by the Peruvian RRP. 
26 Although, the Peruvian RRP is already focused on some of the poorest provinces, they likely still hide large 
inequalities across households and villages.   
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In particular, we first explore these hypotheses by checking for heterogeneous impacts by 
schooling and ethnicity of the household head, village size, and altitude. The analysis by village size 
may  be  particularly  important  in  the  case  of  the  Peruvian  RRP.  Fieldwork  for  the  2006  survey 
showed that in many cases, treated roads were connecting a relatively large village with a very 
small one, with many other small villages along the road. If one thinks that some of the relatively 
large villages already have key markets and public services available, then we could expect that 
larger impacts would concentrate on the smaller villages as these would be the ones for whom 
transaction costs would be reduced most. Table 7 shows that the RRP did have effects on labor 
income for households residing in villages above 3,400 meters of altitude for which a motorized road 
was treated. Households with more educated heads and residing in larger villages (more than 850 
inhabitants) also present positive impacts but they fall short of being statistically significant. On the 
other hand, treated non-motorized tracks show even weaker average effects and more variability, 
with no specific group presenting any significant positive income effects. 
Table 7 also shows positive and significant income effects for households residing in villages 
with  better  initial  endowments  of  productive  infrastructure  such  as  electricity,  local  markets  and 
communications, at least in the case of motorized roads. These results support the argument that 
the rehabilitation and maintenance of rural roads need to be complemented by key infrastructure to 
lead to higher incomes. 
The positive changes implied by the RRP are further supported when we observe effects on 
employment decisions by individuals. Table 8 shows that individuals residing in villages associated 
with treated motorized roads increase their dedication to waged employment (both agricultural and 
non-agricultural) by 10 days a year and reduce their participation in the family farm as unpaid family 
workers. These effects are small with respect to total days worked a year by an individual (171), 
which  could  explain  why  the  program  does  not  lead  towards  significant  increases  in  household 
income, but remain important with respect to the time dedicated to waged employment at baseline. 
On the other hand, residents near non-motorized tracks increase their dedication to the farm as a 
non-remunerated family worker by 16 days a year. Those 16 days a year represent a 30 percent 
increase from the number of working days they dedicated to this kind of labor at baseline. 
In  table  9  we  analyze  the  changes  in  employment  patterns  generated  by  the  RRP 
intervention  by  age,  gender,  and  mother  tongue.  As  observed  in  motorized  roads,  the  switch 
towards wage employment seems to be led by adults in the peak of their productive years; that is, 
between  25  and  50  years  old.  At  the  same  time,  though,  females  seem  to  increase  their 
participation in agricultural jobs while males focus on non-agricultural jobs. Notice that in the case of  
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females,  they  seem  to  be  abandoning  work  at  the  farm  where  they  were  participating  as  non-
remunerated family workers. In the case of non-motorized tracks, the opposite switch towards farm 
work is also concentrated among females. Another important result is that employment effects seem 
to accrue among individuals reporting quechua or aymara as their mother tongue. 
The important gender effects on employment are very relevant, especially in the case of 
non-motorized  tracks,  as  they  were  specifically  included  in  the  program  for  their  relevance  to 
women.  If  further  income  effects  materialize  later,  it  can  be  said  that  women  have  been 
economically  empowered  within  the  household  by  the  Peruvian  RRP  as  they  increase  their 
participation in income-generating activities with respect to their male counterparts
27.  
Thus,  employment  effects  support  the  hypothesis  that  economic  opportunities  may  have 
indeed changed with the RRP, but these are not large enough to imply income effects, except when 
focusing on households residing in high-altitude villages or with pre-existent endowments of key 
productive  infrastructure,  at  least  in  the  case  of  motorized  roads.  Next,  we  analyze  effects  on 
household investments in the education and health of their members.  
4.3  Impacts on household investments in human capital 
With respect to household investments in human capital, we find a strong effect in school 
attendance for children in villages associated with treated motorized tracks, as well as in morbidity 
and  use  of  local  health  facilities  for  both  types  of  roads.  School  attendance  effects  are  clearly 












                                                 
27 It is important to mention that women increase their participation in productive activities without affecting the 
time they dedicate to household chores. We do not report those results here but they can be available from 























28. Attendance increased by about 7 percentage points among older boys (12-18 
years old), an important effect considering that attendance by such a group at baseline was only 84 
percent. Considering the age group, it is possible that this effect may imply that with the program, 
boys are better able to attend secondary school while continuing to live within the nuclear family, 
rather than permanently migrating to a larger city
29. For the younger girls (6-11 years old), school 
attendance increased by 6 percentage points from an initial 93 percent attendance rate for this 
group at baseline. That is, these young girls are reaching perfect attendance in primary school, 
eliminating a previously negative gender bias. 
The lack of effects on younger boys may not be of concern, considering that this group’s 
level of attendance was already very high (95%) at baseline. On the other hand, the lack of effects 
among older girls is worrisome as this group had a lower attendance level at baseline, and indicates 
that  gender  inequalities  are  still  affecting  girls  in  the  higher  levels  of  primary  school  or  at  the 
entrance to high school. If such is the case, it would be useful to identify whether the reason is 
associated with a lower value parents give to higher education of girls, or if it is instead explained by 
the  higher  vulnerability  girls  face  with  respect  to  the  level  of  insecurity  when  traveling  longer 
distances. 
                                                 
28 The attendance reported here refers to the period prior to the survey, and not the current one. Luckily, 
ENAHO has both variables. Current attendance is much lower at around 50% for high school level students, 
but the reports on attendance in the previous period in ENAHO are similar to those reported here. 
29 This hypothesis will be further evaluated using the individual migration data that has not been included in 
this version of the study.  
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Finally, table 11 reports the Peruvian RRP’s impact on morbidity and use of health services 
by adults and children under five. We find a reduction in the incidence of illnesses and accidents in 
the four weeks prior to the date of the survey, especially for children under five and in the villages 
with treated motorized roads. In this case, the morbidity rate falls almost 4 percentage points among 
all members, but the reduction is almost 9 percentage points when looking only at children under 
five. The effect on the use of health services (consultations) is also negative, which is somewhat 
puzzling. An explanation could be that improved rural roads may allow the health system to work for 
the population in remote areas not by attending to them when they are sick but rather by providing 
them with useful health information that helps prevent illness and thus the need for consultations at 
the health center. Notice that the consultation effect is also higher for children under five, and in that 
case we also need to consider that more accessible health facilities help them reach children with 
nutritional supplements. Such hypothesis is indeed consistent with the finding that households with 
children under five in these localities report having benefited more (6-8 percentage points) from 
early  childhood  development  programs,  considering  that most  of the  work  of  the  corresponding 
nutritional and health programs is made off the health post or center (see Table 12).  
On the other hand, a somewhat puzzling result is found among those that were treated 
through non-motorized tracks, as the use of consultations at health facilities for children under five 
drops by 12 percentage points, even though the reduction in morbidity is not found to be statistically 
significant. However, we should be careful with these results as the sample size for children under 
five in these localities is rather small, which is also true for the educational outcomes reported in 
table 10 (see Table 13) 
5.  Summary and discussion 
The  study  looked  at  the  early  impacts  of  a  rural  roads  program  that  is  based  on  an 
institutional innovation characterized by the contracting of private local firms for the rehabilitation 
and maintenance of rural roads with local supervision by community leaders setting incentives that 
favour prevention activities and a sustainable and timely maintenance of rural roads. We find that 
this  institutional  innovation,  promoted  by  the  PROVIAS  DESCENTRALIZADO  of  the  Ministry  of 
Transport and Communication, quickly improved road transitability which in turn led to significant 
changes in employment patterns and increased investments in education and health. Income effects 
are not significant on average, but they appear strong for certain groups, especially in villages with 
pre-existent endowments of key productive infrastructure. These results, though, are concentrated 
on interventions in motorized roads, although there are significant changes in employment patterns  
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in the case of non-motorized tracks that seem to indicate an increased participation of women in 
farm activities. 
The impacts on road transitability are positive for the Peruvian RRP, and more generally, for 
the  contracting  of  local  private  firms  for  the  rehabilitation  and  maintenance  of  rural  roads  in 
developing countries. Considering that this study focuses on the cohort of interventions that started 
in 2004, nine years after the program began, the positive effects indicate that the intervention has 
been able to control local capture and corruption threats. Although it may still be the case that some 
money  is  diverted  and/or  that  some  special  families  benefit  more  from  employment  by  local 
maintenance  firms,  it  seems  that  the  output-based  contracts  have  helped  the  program  to  still 
present improvements in road transitability after almost a decade of interventions. 
On the other hand, observed income effects support the notion that road improvements need 
to be complemented with other key infrastructure, although it is still possible that more time may be 
needed for income effects to spread to other villages, considering that the follow up survey we 
analyze here was done only two years after the intervention began. Indeed, employment changes 
on all treated households would support the idea that important changes in economic conditions 
already occurred with road improvements, although they may take more time to materialize in less 
endowed environments.  
Also, the differences in employment opportunities by type of road indicate that the latter 
plays different roles in connecting rural people to key markets. Motorized roads seem to play the 
more recognized role of connecting rural households to larger cities where product and job markets 
are  more  developed  and  schools  and  health  facilities  are  available.  On  the  other  hand,  non-
motorized tracks play a more important role in moving individuals from their houses to the farms, 
especially  for  adult  women.  These  changes  are  particularly  more  significant  for  women  who 
increase their participation in economic activities, which likely empower them within the household. 
The  inclusion  of  treatments  to  non-motorized  tracks  is  supported  as we  find  that  the  increased 
participation  of  women  in  economic  activities  at  the  family  farm  is  particularly  stronger  in  such 
interventions. 
The Peruvian RRP also had early effects on school attendance and morbidity in the case of 
treated  motorized  roads  underscoring  the  importance  of  this  type  of  intervention  for  household 
investments in human capital. However, the school attendance effects are not found significant for 
older girls (12-18 years), for which the attendance problem was more worrisome to begin with, and 
suggest the need for further interventions to promote gender equity in schooling investments by  
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rural  households.  The  morbidity  effects  in  turn  are  especially  significant  for  children  under  five. 
These results would indicate the need to consider availability of rural roads when analyzing the 
capacity  of  the  Juntos program  to  enforce  the  conditionalities  on  school  attendance  and  health 
checkups by mothers and children. 
Finally, considering that the analysis presented here is based on a follow up survey applied 
after only a year or two from the beginning of the intervention, it would be important to continue the 
analysis of this cohort of interventions by the RRP so that we could elucidate whether, for instance, 
the  lack  of  income  effects  is  because  these  effects  need  more  time  to  show  up,  or  whether 
complementary interventions are required. More generally, following interventions over time would 
allow us to explore deeply into the dynamics of RRP’s effects, that is, which impacts need more time 
to mature, and also whether earlier impacts are sustained in time. 
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Table 1: Key indicators available in household and community-level surveys   
Indicators  Description of variables  Source 
a/ 
Transport       
Travel time  Time in minutes needed to go from the initial to the final point of the road  CLS 
Traffic intensity  Average number of public and private transportation units using the road, and frequency of 
public units  CLS 
Cost of public transportation  Ticket prices for transporting people and cargo  CLS 
Usability of the road  Number of months the road was closed over the past 12 months  CLS 
Access to health and education       
Schooling  Maximum level of schooling attained by each individual  HLS 
School attendance  Proportion of children currently attending school  HLS 
School accessibility  Means of transport used to go to school and travel time  HLS 
School availability in the locality  Number of schools available in the locality, by level  CLS 
Illness  Number of days individuals were sick/disabled, incidence of diarrhea among children  HLS 
Use of health care  Number of individuals that consulted with doctors  HLS 
   Pregnancies with birth control consultancies, institutional births over the last two years  HLS 
Accessibility to health care  Means of transport used to go to the nearest health facility and travel time  HLS 
Availability of health facilities  Number of health facilities available in the locality, by level  CLS 
Access to other services       
Public telephone  Availability of public phone in the locality  CLS 
Internet  Availability of internet in the locality  CLS 
Radio  Availability of radio in the locality  CLS 
TV signal  Availability of public TV signal in the locality  CLS 
Income and employment       
Income  Total monthly labor income, by individual and household  HLS 
Diversification  Proportion of income coming from agricultural, livestock and non-agricultural activities  HLS 
Wages 
Average agricultural and non-agricultural wages for unskilled labor in the locality  HLS 
Time use  Time dedicated to domestic activities, by age and gender  HLS 




Table 2: Key indicators available in household and community-level surveys (… continuation)   
Indicators  Description of variables  Source 
Productive activities       
Agricultural land  Size of the plots owned and managed by household members  HLS 
Land use intensity  Land cultivated by household members  HLS 
Productivity  Yields of main products and value added per hectare  HLS 
Livestock  Number of heads by type of animal  HLS 
Productive assets  Number and value of key equipment and machinery  HLS 
Trade  Proportion of production destined to the local and regional markets  HLS 
Market accessibility  Means of transport used to go to the main market (local fair) and travel time  HLS 
Access to agricultural services  Number of households with access to credit and technical assistance  HLS 
Expenditures and poverty       
Household expenditures  Total per capita monthly expenditures  HLS 
Poverty rate  Proportion of households with expenditures under the poverty and extreme poverty lines  HLS 
Unmet basic needs  Proportion of households without at least one of the basic needs unmet (treated water, sewage, type of 
roof, children in school age not attending school, large dependency ratio)  HLS 
Social capital       
Migration  Number of permanent and temporary migrants and immigrants  HLS 
Social organizations  Number of social organizations in the locality  CLS 
Presence of public programs  number of public programs that operated in the locality over the past two years, and number of 
beneficiaries in the locality  HLS 
Participation  Number of households with individuals that are active members of local social organizations  HLS 
Opinion of the program       
Performance of the program  Perception of the quality of rehabilitation and maintenance of roads  CLS 
Impact  Perception of the types of benefits brought by the rehabilitation and maintenance of the road  HLS / CLS 
Distribution of benefits 
Proportion of households that report having benefited with the rehabilitation and maintenance of road  HLS 




Table 3: Pre-treatment differences for 2004 cohort  
Variables  Control  Treatment  Difference  T-stat 
Household variables           
Age groups           
     [0-8]  26.8  28.1  -1.4  -1.52  * 
     [9-18]  25.1  24.5  0.6  0.70   
     [19-35]  23.5  23.5  0.0  -0.05   
     older than 36  24.7  23.9  0.8  0.92   
School attainment (3 years or older)           
     None  15.6  15.4  0.2  0.20   
     Pre - school  8.6  9.5  -0.9  -1.56  * 
     Primary  48.5  48.5  0.0  0.04   
     Secondary  24.1  23.7  0.4  0.46   
     Superior  3.2  2.8  0.3  0.93   
    Access to water (%)  52.7  52.2  0.5  0.20   
     Female head (%)  11.1  10.9  0.2  0.15   
     Head with indigenous mother tongue (%)  62.5  60.0  2.5  1.15   
     Per Capita Expenditure (monthly soles)  87.0  91.8  -4.8  -1.21   
     Per Capita Income (monthly soles)  91.1  92.3  -1.3  -0.24   
Poverty           
     Extreme (%)  51.8  50.5  1.3  0.57   
     No extreme (%)  30.4  30.4  0.0  0.02   
Village level variables            
     Population size (# individuals)  874.7  1023.4  -148.7  -0.76   
     Altitude (meters above sea level)  2722.6  2799.0  -76.4  -0.55    




Table 4: Baseline - Follow-up statistics and impact of rural roads on transportation  
Nº of Treated Control Diff Treated Control Diff
villages (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Motorized roads
Roads rehabilitated in past 2 years 235 0.92 0.73 0.18 1.72 1.57 0.15 -0.03 -0.03
(0.14) (0.15) (0.20) (0.22)
Road of reference
Travel time 235 101.45 99.55 1.90   69.55 84.71 -15.16 -17.06 -28.07 *
(11.26) (13.01) (14.70) (16.51)
# months road remains blocked 1.97 n.a. n.a. 2.60 n.a. n.a. 0.63 *** 0.59 ***
(0.16) (0.18)
Non-Motorized tracks
Roads rehabilitated in past 2 years 74 1.14 0.39 0.75 *** 1.31 1.03 0.28 -0.47 -0.44
(0.23) (0.25) (0.34) (0.38)
Road of reference
Travel time  74 172.87 180.34 -7.46 137.27 162.97 -25.70 -18.24 * -37.04 ***
(5.45) (37.35) (12.69) (9.55)
# months road remains blocked 2.125 n.a. n.a. 2.852 n.a. n.a. 0.73 * 0.64
(0.40) (0.46)
Notes: Each row in the table is from a separate regression.  Double difference (DD) estimates are reported as measures of impact. Standard deviations in columns (3), (6) and (7) are adjusted by clustering 













Table 5: Baseline - Follow-up statistics and impact of rural roads on transportation 
  Motorized roads  Non-motorized tracks 
Variables  2004  2006     2004  2006    
Perception of quality of intervention by community leaders             
Rehabilitation (=1 if considered adequate)  62.1  80.6  ***  84.1  60.0  ** 
Maintenance (=1 if considered adequate)  67.9  75.0    70.5  47.1  ** 
Perception of quality of intervention by households             
Both (=1 if hh benefited from road intervention´)  60.1  73.9  ***  47.4  65.0  *** 
Reasons             
Improved access to:             
Health care  48.9  64.2  ***  33.3  63.2  *** 
Schools  38.1  57.3  ***  21.8  54.2  *** 
Markets  85.1  69.3  ***  74.4  65.3   
Job opportunities  40.6  57.3  ***  14.1  56.3  *** 
Reduced prices of processed goods  21.1  30.0  ***  5.1  11.1   
Other  15.8  20.4     20.5  17.4    
*** significant at 0.01, ** significant at 0.05, * significant at 0.1.  
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Table 6: Baseline - Follow-up statistics and impact of rural roads on household labor income, expenditures and poverty  
Treated Control Diff Treated Control Diff
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Motorized roads
   Household monthly income  358.31 365.17 -6.87 339.62 340.07 -0.45 6.42 6.18
(18.51) 18.55 (19.36) (19.63)
   Household monthly expenditure 407.01 388.55 18.47 443.82 427.98 15.84 -2.63 -2.63
(24.49) 24.49 (29.51) (29.51)
Poverty rate
Extreme 61.25 59.55 1.69 62.80 65.62 -2.82 -4.51 -4.91
(2.52) 2.54 (3.04) (3.07)
No extreme 20.04 23.41 -3.38 * 16.18 16.20 -0.02 3.36 3.68
(2.04) 2.05 (2.81) (2.85)
Non-poor 18.70 17.06 1.65 20.99 18.26 2.73 1.08 1.24
(2.04) 2.05 (2.39) (2.44)
Non-Motorized tracks
   Household monthly income  322.06 330.81 -8.76 291.14 262.46 28.67 37.43 31.86
(27.96) 28.09 (32.59) (32.97)
   Household monthly expenditure 372.62 371.45 1.18 393.15 349.08 44.07 42.90 42.90
(37.19) 37.19 (47.29) (47.29)
Poverty rate
Extreme 62.58 58.71 3.87 69.79 69.03 0.76 -3.11 -2.26
(4.42) 4.43 (5.82) (5.88)
No extreme 20.43 24.03 -3.60 12.99 19.57 -6.58 * -2.98 -2.63
(3.65) 3.66 (5.17) (5.29)
Non-poor 16.97 17.20 -0.23 17.26 11.51 5.76 * 5.99 4.89
(3.38) 3.39 (4.35) (4.41)
Notes: Each row in the table is from a separate regression.  Double difference (DD) estimates are reported as measures of impact. Standard deviations in columns (3), (6) and (7) are adjusted by clustering 








Table 7: Heterogeneities in the impact of the RRP: Household labor income 
 








Base Model 1493 358.31 6.18 470 322.06 31.86
(19.63) (32.97)
Household head´s schooling
Lower 1908 308.40 -8.25 599 306.99 40.90
(24.45) (41.13)
Higher 1070 433.57 32.01 336 344.05 15.60
(32.93) (55.43)
Village size
Small 500 347.00 35.82 187 312.13 6.37
(34.42) (52.71)
Medium 472 357.32 -14.13 126 298.66 62.09
(35.57) (66.02)
Large 337 375.45 47.72 107 413.73 -79.08
(41.45) (71.45)
Altitude
Low 393 347.40 -34.26 87 265.88 65.52
(38.16) (78.36)
Medium 399 384.28 21.97 120 368.37 -8.77
(37.65) (68.86)




Without 748 348.06 -5.59 208 328.60 -7.03
(27.68) (50.33)
With 561 371.88 64.02 ** 212 351.74 8.33
(32.20) (50.04)
Marketplace
Without 1195 359.95 0.91 390 343.60 22.59
(21.75) (36.68)
With 110 348.25 269.88 *** 30 241.52 -227.67
(72.38) (142.03)
Public telephone
Without 683 355.75 2.56 261 307.00 13.65
(28.75) (45.06)




Without 804 355.20 45.17 * 328 335.18 4.21
(26.78) (40.17)
With 505 364.46 -6.42 92 350.67 -11.37
(33.76) (77.13)
Credit
Without 1134 357.02 36.39 365 334.65 4.34
(22.52) (37.74)
With 175 373.50 -62.06 55 376.17 44.35
(57.60) (99.14)
Notes: Each group of rows of the same category  is from a separate regression. Coefficient and standard deviations control for household-level fixed effects. Double difference 
estimates are reported as measures of impact. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Heterogeneous categories are defined as follows. Schooling: Lower 
is for household head with primary or no education; Higher, with secondary or higher education. Village size: Small is for villages with less than 300 inhabitants; Medium, with 
more than 300 to 850 inhabitants; Large, with more than 850 inhabitants. Altitude: Low is for villages which are 2500 meters above sea level, Medium, between 2500 and 3400 
meters above sea level, High, from more than 3400 to 5500 meters above sea level.  Power Infrastructure: "with" if the village has a functioning electric power network and/or 
street ligthing. Marketplace: "with" if the village has a functioning marketplace. Public telephone: "with" if the village has a functioning public telephone.  Technical assistance: 
"with" if there are farmers in the village that receive agricultural technical assistance. Credit: "with" if there are farmers in the village that receive credit .
Motorized roads Non-motorized tracks 
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Table 8: Baseline - Follow-up statistics and impact of rural roads on employment (%) 
 
Nº of  Treated Control Diff Treated Control Diff
individuals (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Motorized roads
Working days per year 4141 170.929 170.206 0.723 168.105 172.134 -4.029 -4.752 -4.553
(4.412) (4.417) (5.367) (5.420)
Wage - Agriculture 4141 7.501 6.313 1.188 10.506 5.712 4.793 ** 3.606 ** 3.808 **
(1.574) (1.579) (1.678) (1.702)
Wage - No agriculture 4141 10.044 10.883 -0.839 16.108 11.397 4.710 ** 5.549 ** 5.683 **
(2.011) (2.017) (2.213) (2.244)
Non wage - Agriculture 4141 74.869 77.989 -3.120 75.625 78.078 -2.453 0.667 -0.539
(3.777) (3.781) (5.342) (5.436)
Non wage - No Agriculture 4141 23.776 20.495 3.281 22.810 21.542 1.268 -2.014 -2.036
(3.062) (3.072) (3.275) (3.320)
Unpaid family worker - Agriculture 4141 50.991 50.942 0.049 37.773 47.895 -10.122 *** -10.171 ** -8.986 **
(2.944) (2.950) (4.024) (4.026)
Unpaid family worker - No Agriculture 4141 2.754 2.368 0.385 4.630 6.524 -1.894 -2.280 -2.527
(1.189) (1.193) (1.523) (1.539)
Non-Motorized tracks
Working days per year 1322 177.461 176.311 1.149 179.608 167.201 12.408 * 11.258 10.141
(7.556) (7.536) (9.680) (9.781)
Wage - Agriculture 1322 1.996 4.377 -2.380 4.118 5.425 -1.307 1.074 1.383
(1.802) (1.795) (2.431) (2.457)
Wage - No agriculture 1322 8.976 7.978 0.998 9.858 13.874 -4.016 -5.014 -4.994
(3.191) (3.190) (3.567) (3.633)
Non wage - Agriculture 1322 92.564 92.491 0.072 89.580 89.679 -0.099 -0.171 1.584
(7.275) (7.234) (10.260) (10.544)
Non wage - No Agriculture 1322 16.713 9.898 6.815 * 17.582 10.571 7.011 * 0.197 -1.373
(3.854) (3.848) (4.705) (4.747)
Unpaid family worker - Agriculture 1322 53.783 58.624 -4.841 53.795 41.515 12.279 ** 17.120 ** 16.393 **
(5.472) (5.448) (7.500) (7.511)
Unpaid family worker - No Agriculture 1322 2.470 1.526 0.944 3.752 4.742 -0.990 -1.935 -2.701
(1.772) (1.762) (2.499) (2.530)
Notes: Each row in the table is from a separate regression. Standard deviations in columns (3), (6) and (7) are adjusted by clustering at household level. Coefficient and standard deviations in column (8) 




DD DD (FE) 
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Working days per year 4141 170.929 -4.55 2064 148.991 -9.61 2077 189.195 3.33
(5.42) (7.43) (7.33)
Wage - Agriculture 4141 7.501 3.81 ** 2064 2.215 4.06 * 2077 12.430 3.53
(1.70) (2.41) (2.38)
Wage - No agriculture 4141 10.044 5.68 ** 2064 4.360 3.56 2077 15.535 7.98 **
(2.24) (3.16) (3.12)
Non wage - Agriculture 4141 74.869 -0.54 2064 25.741 2.90 2077 125.913 -3.44
(5.44) (6.92) (6.84)
Non wage - No Agriculture 4141 23.776 -2.04 2064 29.147 -2.91 2077 16.216 -0.73
(3.32) (4.72) (4.66)
Unpaid family worker - Agriculture 4141 50.991 -8.99 ** 2064 82.479 -14.45 *** 2077 18.890 -1.86
(4.03) (5.45) (5.38)
Unpaid family worker - No Agriculture 4141 2.754 -2.53 2064 5.049 -3.14 2077 0.212 -2.00
(1.54) (2.18) (2.16)
Non-Motorized tracks
Working days per year 1322 177.461 10.14 662 142.193 29.92 ** 660 211.522 -8.73
(9.78) (13.29) (13.22)
Wage - Agriculture 1322 1.996 1.38 662 0.621 1.09 660 3.632 1.87
(2.46) (3.47) (3.46)
Wage - No agriculture 1322 8.976 -4.99 662 3.902 -4.23 660 13.089 -5.66
(3.63) (5.10) (5.07)
Non wage - Agriculture 1322 92.564 1.58 662 37.408 16.37 660 149.519 -12.77
(10.54) (13.48) (13.41)
Non wage - No Agriculture 1322 16.713 -1.37 662 20.547 1.03 660 12.674 -3.79
(4.75) (6.72) (6.69)
Unpaid family worker - Agriculture 1322 53.783 16.39 ** 662 75.335 20.46 ** 660 32.110 12.59
(7.51) (10.24) (10.19)
Unpaid family worker - No Agriculture 1322 2.470 -2.70 662 4.379 -4.65 660 0.499 -0.95
(2.53) (3.58) (3.56)
Notes: Each group of rows of the same category  is from a separate regression. Coefficient and standard deviations control for household-level fixed effects. Double difference estimates are reported as measures of impact. 























Table 10: Baseline - Follow-up statistics and impact of rural roads on school attendance (%) 
Nº of  Treated Control Diff Treated Control Diff
individuals (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Motorized roads
Males 6-11 years 711 95.435 92.597 2.837 91.938 90.872 1.066 -1.772 -3.752
(2.009) (2.027) (2.614) (3.082)
Males 12-18 years 612 84.153 89.268 -5.115 * 84.104 79.561 4.543 9.659 ** 7.291 *
(3.044) (2.921) (3.808) (4.276)
Females 6-11 years 734 93.196 95.524 -2.328 95.180 88.719 6.462 *** 8.789 *** 6.898 **
(1.913) (1.953) (2.459) (2.862)
Females 12-18 years 521 80.628 84.530 -3.902 84.022 85.976 -1.954 1.948 -0.222
(3.319) (3.139) (3.696) (4.156)
Non-Motorized tracks
Males 6-11 years 232 92.936 95.637 -2.702 83.689 92.352 -8.662 ** -5.960 -2.751
(3.704) (3.866) (5.275) (6.276)
Males 12-18 years 212 83.541 91.777 -8.236 72.452 85.730 -13.277 ** -5.041 -6.706
(5.328) (4.965) (6.509) (7.372)
Females 6-11 years 222 89.290 91.215 -1.925 85.740 89.567 -3.827 -1.903 -1.789
(4.331) (4.301) (5.678) (6.592)
Females 12-18 years 172 79.579 78.880 0.699 76.656 83.504 -6.847 -7.546 -8.741
(6.410) (5.965) (7.247) (8.286)
Notes: Each row in the table is from a separate regression.  Double difference (DD) estimates are reported as measures of impact. Standard deviations in columns (3), (6) and (7) are adjusted by clustering at household level. 
Coefficient and standard deviations in columns (3), (6) and (7) are adjusted by clustering at household level. Coefficient and standard deviation in column (8) control for household fixed effects. * significant at 10%; ** 
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Table 11: Baseline - Follow-up statistics and impact of rural roads on morbidity and use of health services (%) 
Nª of  Treated Control Diff Treated Control Diff
individuals (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Motorized roads
Sickness and accidents in last 4 weeks
All household members 7574 38.569 35.573 2.996 ** 30.661 31.471 -0.811 -3.807 ** -3.724 **
(1.401) (1.413) (1.426) (1.434)
Children 0-5 years 1396 47.757 42.929 4.828 * 35.830 38.233 -2.403 -7.231 ** -8.789 **
(2.780) (3.100) (3.685) (3.998)
Attention from a heath professional
All household members 7574 21.441 19.804 1.637 20.718 21.661 -0.943 -2.581 ** -2.591 **
(1.154) (1.165) (1.246) (1.255)
Children 0-5 years 1396 38.368 38.442 -0.074 30.063 35.271 -5.208 * -5.134 -8.078 **
(2.673) (2.990) (3.659) (3.972)
Non-Motorized tracks
Sickness and accidents in last 4 weeks
All household members 2348 32.806 34.790 -1.984 33.783 33.219 0.565 2.549 2.141
(2.483) (2.478) (2.552) (2.567)
Children 0-5 years 369 46.487 36.114 10.374 ** 33.724 35.066 -1.342 -11.715 * -7.385
(5.284) (5.508) (6.824) (7.526)
Attention from a heath professional
All household members 2348 17.254 18.677 -1.422 19.933 18.406 1.526 2.949 2.598
(1.989) (1.985) (2.109) (2.120)
Children 0-5 years 369 35.768 31.436 4.332 22.120 30.876 -8.756 * -13.087 ** -12.498 *
(4.999) (5.207) (6.375) (7.008)
Notes: Each row in the table is from a separate regression.  Double difference (DD) estimates are reported as measures of impact. Standard deviations in columns (3), (6) and (7) are adjusted by clustering at household level. 









Table 12: Baseline - Follow-up statistics and impact of rural roads on access to social programs (%) 
Nº of Treated Control Diff Treated Control Diff
households (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Motorized roads
Social Programs
Food 1525 73.208 72.055 1.153 62.390 56.849 5.541 ** 4.388 4.388
(2.402) (2.402) (2.695) (2.695)
Education 1525 63.396 64.658 -1.261 65.409 62.603 2.806 4.067 4.067
(2.461) (2.461) (2.595) (2.595)
Health 1525 54.843 53.288 1.555 75.849 73.425 2.424 0.869 0.869
(2.398) (2.398) (2.852) (2.852)
ECD1
All households 1525 57.484 54.658 2.827 76.226 73.699 2.528 -0.299 -0.299
(2.388) (2.388) (2.834) (2.834)
Households with children under 6 years 958 79.923 81.136 -1.214 88.996 82.273 6.723 *** 7.937 ** 7.937 **
(2.415) (2.415) (3.353) (3.353)
ECD2
All households 1525 76.730 76.027 0.702 81.761 80.548 1.213 0.511 0.511
(2.093) (2.093) (2.442) (2.442)
Households with children under 6 years 958 95.560 97.727 -2.167 93.243 89.318 3.925 *** 6.092 *** 6.092 ***
(1.529) (1.529) (2.093) (2.093)
Non-Motorized tracks
Social Programs
Food 478 68.619 67.364 1.255 60.251 61.088 -0.837 -2.092 -2.092
(4.378) (4.378) (4.788) (4.788)
Education 478 69.874 64.854 5.021 67.782 70.293 -2.510 -7.531 -7.531
(4.264) (4.264) (4.875) (4.875)
Health 478 44.351 51.046 -6.695 73.222 75.314 -2.092 4.603 4.603
(4.297) (4.297) (5.118) (5.118)
ECD1
All households 478 46.025 51.046 -5.021 74.059 76.151 -2.092 2.929 2.929
(4.280) (4.280) (5.086) (5.086)
Households with children under 6 years 261 73.134 79.528 -6.393 82.836 92.126 -9.290 ** -2.897 -2.897
(4.721) (4.721) (6.143) (6.143)
ECD2
All households 478 71.967 74.477 -2.510 80.753 80.753 0.000 2.510 2.510
(3.842) (3.842) (4.422) (4.422)
Households with children under 6 years 261 94.776 94.488 0.288 91.045 96.850 -5.806 ** -6.094 -6.094
(2.882) (2.882) (3.904) (3.904)
Notes: Each row in the table is from a separate regression. Standard deviations in columns (3), (6) and (7) are adjusted by clustering at household level. Coefficient and standard deviations in column 8 control for 
household-level fixed effects. Double difference estimates are reported as measures of impact. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  Dependent variables are defined as follows. Food 
programs include the following: a) Glass of Milk Program,  Nurturing Basket Program (PANFAR), b) Food for Children Program (PACFO), c) Food for the sick and the elder and d) Cheap eateries. Education 
Programs include the following: a) Breakfast or food for school students, b) School uniforms and school footwear, c) School books  and schooling material, d) Student insurance at school level,  e) Juvenile job 
training and d) Job training for women. Health Programs include de following:  a) Control of children´s growth and development (CRED) , b) Family planning, c) Control of Tuberculosis and d) Vaccination Program.  








Table 13: Number of observations per group of analysis 
Total Lower Higher Small Medium Large Low Medium High Female Male Younger Middle Older
Motorized roads
     Households 1521 965 556 510 480 344 407 402 443 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
     All individuals 7574 4849 2725 2431 2471 1769 2082 1970 2193 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
     All members > 15 years old 3642 n.a. n.a. 1360 1321 961 1127 1090 1193 2064 2077 1270 2091 780
     Children 0-5 years 1396 881 515 424 465 334 389 351 399 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
   Boys
Males 6-11 years 711 459 252 215 263 157 210 188 198 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Males 12-18 years 612 403 209 194 198 144 168 149 183 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
   Girls
Females 6-11 years 734 466 268 239 233 180 195 197 218 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Females 12-18 years 521 331 190 165 168 124 144 130 153 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Non-Motorized tracks
     Households 474 303 171 185 126 111 89 124 168 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
     All individuals 2348 1501 847 890 633 555 431 603 856 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
     All members > 15 years old 1181 n.a. n.a. 488 350 343 230 362 478 662 660 421 661 240
     Children 0-5 years 369 228 141 153 103 78 78 80 146 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
   Boys
Males 6-11 years 232 156 76 83 62 48 37 58 79 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Males 12-18 years 212 143 69 83 51 53 42 52 80 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
   Girls
Females 6-11 years 222 143 79 95 67 31 42 49 85 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Females 12-18 years 172 98 74 55 50 52 32 57 58 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Notes: Heterogeneous categories are defined as follows. Education: Lower is for household head with primary or no education; Higher, with secondary or higher education.  Village size: Small is for villages with 
less than 300 inhabitants; Medium, with more than 300 to 850 inhabitants; Large, with more than 850 inhabitants. Altitude: Low is for villages which are 2500 meters above sea level, Medium, between 2500 and 
3400 meters above sea level, High, from more than 3400 to 5500 meters above sea level.  Gender: if the individual is female or male. Age: Cohort 1 is for indivuduals younger than 25 years old; Cohort 2, from 26 
to 50 years old; Cohort 3, older than 50.  





Figure 1: Treated Roads – Geographical context 
 
 
Figure 2: Treated Roads – Examples of Non-motorized tracks  
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Figure 4: Treated Roads – Example of before and after 
 
 
 
 